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WHERE THE RUBBER MEETS THE ROAD: THINKING ABOUT
EXPERT EVIDENCE AS EXPERT TESTIMONY
SIMON A. COLE*
IT has been more than a decade since the United States Supreme Court
first delved into the problem of defining the limits of scientific (or more
precisely, expert) evidence within the law in the now famous Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. decision and its "progeny."1 During this
period, what has sometimes been called a "cottage industry" of Daubert
scholarship has arisen, generating an enormous amount of legal scholar-
ship and discussion. 2 This attention is far from unwarranted. The use of
expert evidence in the law clearly is an enormously important topic, and
Daubert itself is now considered by evidence scholars, "perhaps the most
important evidence case ever decided."3
This symposium celebrates the publication of the book No Magic
Wand, the culmination and summation of Professors Caudill and LaRue's
* Associate Professor of Criminology, Law & Society, University of California,
Irvine; Ph.D. (Science & Technology Studies), Cornell University; A.B., Princeton
University. For research assistance, I am grateful to Rachel Dioso-Villa, Brenda
Velazquez andJ.B. Robinson. I am greatly indebted to the editors of the Villanova
Law Review for their substantial efforts in editing this article. For transcript
donation, I am extremely grateful to Carolyn Long Solider; Kenneth Saffold;
Robert Feldman and the New England Innocence Project; Brian Walsh and the
Cook County Public Defender; Jessica Reust and the Public Defender Service of
the District of Columbia; Barbara Heyer; Judith Fordham; Ken Murray and the
Office of the Federal Public Defender, Southern District of Ohio; Rosemary
Jackson and Schneider & Associates; Barbara Saavadera and the Habeas Corpus
Resource Center; Beth Weitzner, Cynthia Cimino, Brittany Horstman, Thomas
Regnier, Brett Steinberg and the Miami-Dade Public Defender; Sharlott Swanger
and the Federal Defender Services of Eastern Tennessee; David Hendry and the
Florida Capital Collateral Regional Counsel; Rob Lee and the Virginia Capital
Representation Resource Center; Jacob Zimmermann and the Missouri Public
Defender; George Beckwith; Sandy Feinland, Greg Goldman and the San
Francisco Public Defender; Jonathan P. Willmott; Frans Sital; Charles Stevenson;
John Cunha; and the late Kim Kruglik. I am grateful to David Caudill for the
invitation to the exciting symposium that generated this paper. This project was
funded in part by the National Science Foundation (Award #SES-0347305) and the
Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy. Any opinions, findings,
conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation
or the Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy.
1. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v.Joiner, 522 U.S.
136 (1997).
2. See Lawrence S. Pinsky, The Use of Scientific Peer Review and Colloquia to Assist
Judges in the Admissibility Gatekeeping Mandated by Daubert, 34 Hous. L. Rv. 527,
528 (1997).
3. See Paul Giannelli, Daubert Revisited, 41 CRIM. L. BULL. 5 (2005).
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substantial contribution to this discussion.4 Professors Caudill and La-
Rue's contributions are of particular interest to me because they attempt
to bridge the discussion between two very different literatures: a literature
that explores the relationship between science, technology and law from
the point of view of the discipline of Science and Technology Studies
("S&TS") and the more familiar (to legal readers) doctrinal legal scholar-
ship on expert evidence. Because S&TS, as a discipline, endeavors to pro-
duce empirically accurate accounts of scientific and technological
knowledge-making as practices, it might reasonably be expected to have
something to contribute to legal discourses that center around the need to
appropriately handle expert evidence produced by scientists and techni-
cians. As a scholar who was trained in S&TS and now works in a Law and
Society program, Professors Caudill and LaRue's efforts to synthesize these
two streams of thought are of particular interest to me. In this paper,
therefore, I would like to treat the publication of No Magic Wand as an
occasion to take stock of the debate over expert evidence with particular
emphasis on the potential contribution to this debate that has been, or
could be, offered by S&TS. I will argue that the purported debate be-
tween legal and social scientific scholars, though still unresolved and per-
haps irresolvable, masks large areas of consensus between most scholars.
In particular, I will argue that those disagreements that do remain be-
tween legal and social scientific scholars are of little consequence in resolv-
ing how to best move forward in helping courts resolve what I call "the
expert evidence problem."
I. THE EXPERT EVIDENCE PROBLEM & JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING
By way of introduction, it useful to begin by reiterating why expert
evidence is considered a problem, and why judicial gatekeeping is consid-
ered a solution to that problem. As Professors Denbeaux and Risinger
note, the mere fact that expert evidence can be wrong or "bad" is not
sufficient to render expert evidence problematic, because that is true of all
evidence. 5 Expert evidence can be combated like all other evidence
through mechanisms such as cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence and exclusion for lack of relevance. Indeed, the Daubert opinion
contains a passage that would seem to imply that these should be the nor-
mal modes of combating expert evidence.6 Arguably, it might be inferred
that the Court believed litigants should resort to admissibility challenges
only in extraordinary cases. Some evidence scholars, for example, have
4. See DAVID S. CAUDILL & LEWIs H. LARUE, No MAGIC WAND: THE IDEALIZA-
TION OF SCIENCE IN LAw (2006).
5. See generally Mark Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert
Reliability: How the Question You ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REv.
15 (2003).
6. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 ("Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the tradi-
tional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.").
804 [Vol. 52: p. 803
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now taken the position that Daubert's admissibility requirement is not nec-
essary at all and that expert evidence should simply be treated like all
other evidence. 7 Of course, perhaps predictably, that has not been the
case; in creating an admissibility requirement (or reinforcing the existing
one), the Court created a procedural structure that is now simply treated
as yet another weapon in the litigation arsenal.
8
The courts essentially have two choices in dealing with expert evi-
dence. One option is to take the advice of those scholars cited above,
allow all expert evidence into court and rely on that great truth-producing
engine, 9 cross-examination, to sort good evidence from bad. The other is
to seek to "manage" expert evidence in some way-that is, to adopt some
sort of admissibility procedure, mechanism, threshold, etc., by which the
fact-finder is not permitted to hear some expert evidence. As Professors
Denbeaux and Risinger cogently note, the Court's decision to opt for the
latter, whether under a Frye or a Daubert regime, necessarily implies that it
has determined that the former solution is inadequate.' 0 The reason for
this must be that some expert evidence has the potential to be particularly
misleading and therefore poisonous to the fact-finder, so poisonous in-
deed that the fact-finder must be protected from the expert (hence the
gatekeeping metaphor). And, the reason for that must have something to
do with the authority that is accorded "experts" in contemporary society.
The Court seems to be reasoning that weak, downright misleading or even
false evidence cloaked in the guise of expertise is far more pernicious than
weak evidence lacking that imprimatur. Thus, we have admissibility stan-
dards so that those proffered witnesses who choose to don the mantle of
"expert" may be held to a higher standard than the mere "relevance" re-
quired of ordinary witnesses. Under Daubert, "relevance" is neatly paired
with an equally succinct R concept: "reliability."
The focus of the expert evidence literature has been primarily on the
second R, "reliability." The Court's framework generates all sorts of vex-
ing questions, such as how reliability is to be determined and whether
judges are competent and consistent at determining reliability. I will not
retrace those debates here.
For my purposes, I will note one perhaps unanticipated consequence
of admissibility framework. The Court mandated a dichotomous frame-
work for evaluating expert evidence. In the gatekeeping framework, evi-
dence is either admissible or inadmissible. This is plainly inconsistent with
the nature of expert evidence itself, which must be arrayed along a contin-
uum of reliability between highly reliable evidence and evidence that is
7. See Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1047 (2003).
8. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Daubert in the Law Office: Routinizing Procedural
Change, Address at the Annual Meeting of Law and Society Association (July,
2006).
9. See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367, at 32 (Chadbourne Rev. 1974).
10. See Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 5.
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not reliable at all. With admirable economy, Professor Haack summed up
my point as follows: "admissibility" is categorical; "reliability" is continu-
ous. l' The dichotomous framework obviously invites the usual problems
of drawing bright-line distinctions for phenomena which exist on a contin-
uum. In addition, it presumably undervalues some evidence (highly relia-
ble evidence that is treated as legally equivalent to far less reliable but
nonetheless "admissible" evidence, plus pretty good evidence thatjust fails
to meet the admissibility threshold but legally is considered equivalent to
'Junk" evidence) and overvalues other evidence (marginally reliable evi-
dence that just barely meets the admissibility threshold but is legally
equivalent to highly reliable evidence, plus 'junk" evidence that has no
redeeming value whatsoever, but nonetheless is considered legally
equivalent to evidence that has some value, but not quite enough to meet
the admissibility threshold).
It is important to note the homology between Daubert's admissibility/
inadmissibility dichotomy and a closely related dichotomous metaphor
that was quite prevalent at the time: Peter Huber's 'junk science"/authen-
tic science metaphor. The relationship between Daubert and Huber's in-
fluential popular book on the supposed epidemic of 'junk science" in the
courts, and his popularization, if not coining, of this term, is complicated,
and I will not fully explore it here. 12 The point is that Huber's propaga-
tion of the notion that there was a thing called 'junk science" that could
easily and reliably be distinguished from "real" science may have subtly
reinforced the idea that assigning expert evidence to neat categories of
"admissible" and "inadmissible" evidence would be both workable and rel-
atively unproblematic.
Consider, for example, Huber's characterization of 'junk science" as
the "mirror image" of authentic science. 13 Huber's metaphor could be
read in at least two ways. On the one hand, one might read "mirror im-
age" to mean "diametrically opposed," in which it should be easy to distin-
guish 'junk" from "real" science. On the other hand, the term "mirror
image" is also used to denote objects that are indistinguishable, or barely
distinguishable, from one another, as in the phrase "mirror image twins."
In this sense, Huber's metaphor points precisely to the issue that will be-
come the problem: that trial judges will find themselves in a house of mir-
rors in which every expert appears to be legitimate or, worse, one in which
11. I am grateful to Professor Haack, who made this point at the symposium
and who explicates this point clearly elsewhere in her work. See Susan Haack, Not
Cynicism, but Synechism: Lessons from Classical Pragmatism, 41 Transactions of the
Charles S. Peirce Soc'y 239, 240 (2005); see also, D. A. Nance, Reliability and the
Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REv. 191, 200 (2003) ("[S]cientific validity
is not an all-or-nothing characteristic; rather, it is a matter of degree.").
12. For a suggestive account, see generally Gary Edmond & David Mercer,
Litigation Life: Law-Science Knowledge Construction in (Bendectin) Mass Toxic Tort Litiga-
tion, 30 Soc. STUD. OF Sci. 265 (2000).
13. See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO's REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURT-
ROOM (1991).
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the false experts appear trustworthy (because they are "slick" charlatans
and con men) and the true experts appear untrustworthy (because as le-
gitimate experts, they are unpolished, bumbling, socially awkward
"geeks"). 14 Indeed, it is wise to recall that the reason we developed the
admissibility standard in the first place was that we were worried about
pseudo-experts who would appear legitimate in the eyes of the jury, not
about pseudo-experts who were readily identifiable as such. In fact, the
whole idea of the pseudo-expert and all the rich terms used to describe
such persons-charlatans, quacks, mountebanks, imposters, frauds, fakes,
swindlers and con artists-is that they are untrustworthy experts who ap-
pear trustworthy, not untrustworthy experts who are identifiable as such. 15
In this sense Daubert would seem to presuppose its own ineffective-
ness, in that it asks legal actors to discriminate between trustworthy and
untrustworthy experts for the precise reason that it is difficult for jurors to
distinguish between them. As a logical matter, Daubert can only be saved
by assuming that judges, the legal actors Daubert asks to draw the distinc-
tions, have a power of discernment that jurors, the legal actors who are
presumed unable to draw the distinctions, lack. This assumption has been
called into question by recent research, and it probably remains questiona-
ble despite Professors Caudill and LaRue's cogent critique of that
research. 16
At this point, one cannot help but mention yet another dichotomous
framework that is also closely related to the Daubert regime. That, of
course, is the philosopher Sir Karl Popper's theory of falsificationism,
through which knowledge claims can be "demarcated" into two categories:
science and pseudo-science. As many of the participants in this sympo-
sium have already explained, this theory is no longer current among phi-
losophers of science.' 7 The association of Daubert with Popper comes
14. See Sanja K. Ivkovic & Valerie P. Hans, Jurors' Evaluations of Expert Testi-
mony: Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28 LAw ArND Soc. INQUIRY 441, 442
(2003) ("One key assumption underlying the Daubert line of cases is that jurors
might be duped by a persuasive but untrustworthy expert who testifies about mat-
ters that are not based on sound scientific principles or data.").
15. I cannot resist referring here to the epigraph of one of my articles in
which a character in a play by the late August Wilson remarks, "I never would have
guessed he was selling fake insurance." Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting
for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 985
(2005).
16. See CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 4, at 55. See generally Veronica Dahir et
al., Judicial Application of Daubert to Psychological Syndrome and Profile Evidence, 11
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 62 (2005); Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers:
A National Survey ofJudges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAw
& HUM. BEHAV. 433 (2001) (finding high percentage of federal judges have poor
comprehension of Daubert factors and poor scientific literacy).
17. See generally David S. Caudill & Richard E. Redding, Junk Philosophy of Sci-
ence? The Paradox of Expertise and Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 685 (2000); Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Conjectures and Exhumations:
Citations of History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science in US Federal Courts, 14 LAw &
LIT. 309 (2002) (characterizing Havvard as arguing that "longstanding use tri-
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from several sources. First, the Daubert opinion explicitly cites Popper,18 a
move which has been variously interpreted as a more or less wholehearted
endorsement of his philosophy of science. Second, there is a misguided
but understandable tendency to equate the demarcation of admissible
from inadmissible evidence with the demarcation of science from pseudo-
science. Since the popular educated imagination still holds that falsifica-
tionism "solved" the demarcation problem, it is natural to assume that
Popper holds the key to Daubert's problem. 19
II. FROM SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE TO EXPERT TESTIMONY
Although both philosophers of science (and other social scientific in-
quirers about science such as those in the discipline of S&TS) and courts
take as their purported object of inquiry something called "science," for
the most part they are dealing with quite different objects. Philosophers
of science are generally dealing with "science," defined as an open-ended
mode of inquiry for developing accurate knowledge about the natural
world. The scientists about whom philosophers of science and S&TS
scholars are seeking to generate plausible accounts are generally engaged
in open-ended inquiries seeking to generate original new knowledge
about phenomena that are little understood.
Courts, in contrast, are by and large dealing with scientific evidence.
Generally, the knowledge claims that are advanced in courts are not the
cutting edge knowledge claims that occupy both academic scientists and
the philosophers and sociologists who try to account for those scientists.
There are few court cases about, for example, string theory. Legal knowl-
edge claims tend to be much more mundane applications of existing
knowledge claims: How convincing is the evidence that this pathogen
causes this disease? This is particularly the case for forensic science. Very
little, if any, of what is called "forensic science" consists of the sort of open-
ended basic research that is classically the object of philosophy of science.
Some small portion of forensic science might consist of efforts to evaluate
whether certain new technologies might prove forensically useful. The
overwhelming majority of what is called "forensic science," however, con-
sists of routine applications of existing assays to new materials. This is
philosophically equivalent to the routine use of various assays in a large
scientific laboratory. Although some in S&TS have valorized this "techni-
cal" work and emphasized its importance in constructing what counts as
scientific knowledge, 20 this is not generally the sort of work that occupies
umphs over the strict application of falsificationism"); Susan Haack, Trial and Error:
The Supreme Court's Philosophy of Science, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 66 (2005).
18. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
19. Indeed, it may be argued that this was precisely whatJustice Blackmun was
thinking when he cited Popper in Daubert.
20. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAPIN, A SocIAL HIsToRY OF TRUTH, 355 (1994); Kath-
leen Jordan & Michael Lynch, The Mainstreaming of a Molecular Biological Tool: A
[Vol. 52: p. 803
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philosophers of science, such as Popper, who try to articulate how "sci-
ence" may be distinguished from other endeavors.
In short, the Daubert Court, faced with the question of whether a par-
ticular set of evidential claims were properly considered in assessing
whether disease causation could be established, drew on philosophers who
were engaged in quite a different project. The philosophers of science
that the Court drew on, such as Popper, were engaged in the larger pro-
ject of how to characterize the broad enterprise known as "science." In
particular, they were interested in those areas of that enterprise in which
open-ended inquiry is made and new knowledge is generated. In other
words, they were more interested in what went on at Princeton's Institute
for Advanced Study than in what went on at a commercial diagnostic labo-
ratory, even though both may appropriately be viewed as sites where "sci-
ence" occurs.
At a superficial level, of course, the Court's use of philosophy of sci-
ence made sense. The Court was engaged in defining proper scientific
evidence, and philosophy of science may have seemed the area of aca-
demic inquiry that came closest to addressing that problem. Nevertheless,
in fact, the subtle differences between the two endeavors may have been
more consequential than the Court anticipated.
One consequence has been on the academic debate about the Daubert
opinion. If, as I claim, Popper was simply inappropriate for the task with
which the Court was faced, this renders largely moot the debate about
whether Popper is "correct" or "generally accepted" by philosophers and
others who study science. The unfortunate confusion between Daubert
and Popper's projects has been responsible for a great deal of needless
disagreement among scholars and legal actors alike concerning the prob-
lem of the expert witness.
Distinguishing admissible from inadmissible expert evidence is quite
a different thing from distinguishing science from pseudo-science. First,
not all expert evidence is necessarily science. It is well established that
legitimate experts can be technicians or others with "specialized knowl-
edge." This issue was in some sense resolved by Kumho Tire, which clari-
fied the Court's view that Daubert's relevance and reliability requirement
extended to all expert evidence.2 1 Yet, as Professor Edmond points out,
that Court did so by fitting an admissibility threshold that had been de-
vised for an idealized model of science to all expert evidence, whether it
claimed to be "science" or not, something he calls "science through the
back door."22 Second, philosophers of science, like Popper, tend to think
about knowledge claims in larger units of analysis than do lawyers and
Case Study of a Nezw Technique, in TECHNOLOGY IN WORKING ORDER: STUDIES OF
WORK, INTERACTrION, AND TECHNOLOGY 162 (Button ed., 1993).
21. See Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
22. See Gary Edmond, Legal Engineering: Contested Representations of Law, Science
(and Non-Science) and Society, 32 Soc. STUD. OF Sci. 371 (2002).
2007]
7
Cole: Where the Rubber Meets the Road: Thinking about Expert Evidence a
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
judges. Philosophers of science tend to frame problems in terms of disci-
plines, research programs or, at least, lines of research. How do we know
that biology produces reliable knowledge? Or molecular biology? Or evo-
lutionary theory?23 Admissibility determinations tend to focus on smaller
units of analysis: How do we know whether this study establishes causation
of this pathology? The distinction is important because philosophers are
generally thinking about how one can defend the knowledge claims of a
broad approach to knowing the world, whereas judges are thinking about
how one can defend one very specific knowledge claim.
Finally, admissibility is fundamentally a policy determination, whereas
Popper was concerned with defining "science" as a particular, and special,
form of inquiry. It might be argued that the parallel is not really between
admissibility and science, but between reliability and science. But even
then, the parallel does not hold; there are all sorts of highly reliable forms
of knowledge that are nonetheless not science.
Simply put, Daubert is clearly about the distinction between reliable
and unreliable, and thus admissible and inadmissible, evidence. Nowhere
does it purport to be about distinguishing science from pseudo-science.
To be sure, the opinion helped confuse the issue because it discussed reli-
ability in the context of scientific evidence, and, indeed, there is much
slippage in the opinion between describing things as "reliable" and "scien-
tific." For example:
[I]n order to qualify as "scientific knowledge," an inference or
assertion must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed tes-
timony must be supported by appropriate validation-i.e., "good
grounds," based on what is known. In short, the requirement
that an expert's testimony pertain to "scientific knowledge" estab-
lishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.24
In this passage, "scientific" status is equated with both validation and
reliability, neither of which necessarily require that a claim be categorized
as scientific knowledge or be derived by the scientific method.25 Nor, for
that matter, must every claim that we would call "scientific" be validated or
even be susceptible to validation. Given this kind of language, it is no
wonder that much of the discussion of Daubert, from the pages of law jour-
nals to the courtrooms, has focused on whether particular knowledge
claims are "scientific." The Kumho Tire case might be thought to have rem-
edied some of the confusion; in holding that the Daubert gatekeeping re-
23. To be sure, this is not completely true. Popper often discussed specific
knowledge claims, such as "all swans are white," but he also discussed whether
entire disciplines, such as psychoanalysis and Marxist history, were scientific.
24. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
25. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of "Appropriate Validation" in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Interpreted in Light of the Broader Ra-
tionalkt '." - ",ot the Narrow Scientic Tradition, 30 FLA. S..-Ui. L. REv. 735
(2003).
[Vol. 52: p. 803
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quirement applied to all expert evidence, including that based on
technical or specialized knowledge, the court implicitly clarified that not
all expert evidence need be science. But, as Professor Edmond has noted,
the effect of Kumho seems to have been further confusion, in that Popper's
standards for demarcating science from pseudo-science end up being ap-
plied to technical evidence.2 6
Again, one can readily understand how, on a superficial level, the
Court may have been gulled into thinking that the demarcation of admis-
sible from inadmissible or reliable from unreliable evidence was the same
as the demarcation of science from pseudo-science. And, one can then
understand how, saddled with this misapprehension, the Court would view
it as appropriate to draw on by far the most famous demarcator of all,
Popper. Yet, again, this issue is even more fundamental than the mere
fact that Popper was "wrong" or that his view is no longer, if it ever was,
widely accepted among professional philosophers. The more fundamen-
tal issue is that demarcating science from pseudo-science is very seldom, if
ever, a useful exercise in any endeavor, and it is certainly not helpful in
solving the problem that faced the Daubert Court. As Professor Haack
points out, two meanings of the word "scientific," one referring to a dis-
tinct mode of inquiry and the other being a honorific meaning something
like "good," "objective" or "well intentioned," have become thoroughly
confused in modern parlance. 27 The Court's task really had to do with
the latter; it was necessary to distinguish generally well supported evidence
from poorly supported evidence-that is, evidence that, in donning the
mantle of expertise, was more likely to mislead than to educate the fact
finder-rather than to distinguish "scientific" from "pseudo-scientific"
evidence.
In sum, the Daubert regime has been characterized by a great deal of
slippage, in both legal scholarship and practice, between the quite differ-
ent issues of whether evidence is "reliable" or "admissible" and whether it
is "scientific." One example of this may be found in the area I know best:
the admissibility battles over fingerprint evidence, in which legal actors-
including, I would readily admit, myself-exhibited considerable slippage
between these two issues.28 This slippage confused the record made in
these admissibility hearings. Only in the 2004 decision United States v.
Mitchell, five years after the first hearing, did a court bring clarity to the
distinction. 29
26. See generally Edmond, supra note 22.
27. See Haack, supra note 11, at 248.
28. See Michael Lynch & Simon A. Cole, STS on Trial: Dilemmas of Expertise, 35
Soc. STUD. OF Sci. 269 (2005); see also MIcHAEL LYNCH ET AL., TRUTH MACHINE: THE
CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF DNA FINGERPRINTING (forthcoming).
29. See generally United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004); Simon
A. Cole, Does 'Yes' Really Mean Yes? The Attempt to Close Debate on the Admissibility of
Fingerprint Testimony, 45 JURIMETRICSJ. 449 (2005).
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III. SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY STUDIES (S&TS) AND DAUBERT
The problem of whether and how much to trust purported "experts"
is fundamental to my native discipline of S&TS. One of several possible
characterizations of the field of S&TS is that it is the study of experts and
expert knowledge.3 0 It so happens that some efforts have recently been
made to, in effect, re-articulate the mission of the field of S&TS around
this very question of what to do about experts, or more precisely, how to
assign attributions of expertise to various actors in resolving social ques-
tions that invoke some sort of technical knowledge. 3' To be sure, this
effort has been resisted.32 Yet, the resistance has in part argued that this
supposedly necessary re-articulation has already occurred. There is little
serious dispute that expertise is a necessary and important object of study
for S&TS. Where differences arise is over the nature of the study. Most
S&TS scholars take as their object of study the very act of attribution of
expertise by social actors (for instance, lawyers andjudges). Their interest
is documenting, studying, analyzing and revealing the process by which
the status of "expert" is attributed or denied to various claimants.
33
Professors Collins and Evans argue that this work is largely complete34 and
that its point-that "expertise" is something that is attributed to social ac-
tors by other actors, rather than a natural category that exists outside of
social interactions-has been made. They argue that it is time to move on
to a new project, a normative project which would involve sorting out how
to properly manage attributions of expertise, given the undeniable fact that
such attributions cannot be made "naturally."
3 5
Although the bulk of Daubert discussion has taken place largely within
the confines of legal doctrinal scholarship, it is perhaps fair to say that
S&TS has made a modest contribution to the discussion. Indeed, one
30. I am not sure where, or if, this is explicitly stated, but the person who
crystallized it for me was Professor Michael Aaron Dennis.
31. See generally H.M. Collins & Robert Evans, The Third Wave of Science Studies:
Studies of Expertise and Experience, 32 Soc. STUD. OF Sci. 235 (2002).
32. See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Breaking the Waves in Science Studies: Comment on
H.M. Collins and Robert Evans, "The Third Wave of Science Studies," 33 Soc. STUD. OF
Sci. 389 (2003); Arie Rip, Constructing Expertise-in a Third Wave of Science Studies?
33 Soc. STUD. OF ScI. (2003); Brian Wynne, Seasick on the Third Wave? Subverting the
Hegemony of Proportianalism, 33 Soc. STUD. OF ScI. (2003).
33. Exemplary in this regard is Sheila Jasanoff, Expert Games in Silicone Gel
Breast Implant Litigation, in SCIENCE IN COURT 83 (Freeman and Reece eds., 1998).
Another excellent contributor is none other than CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 4.
34. See Collins & Evans, supra note 32. Professors Collins and Evans are care-
ful to note that this sort of work is still worth doing and that they still do it.
35. See id. In so doing, Collins and Evans argue against what may or may not
be a caricature of the rest of S&TS, which is that most S&TS scholars favor a "level-
ing" of expertise attributions: essentially, if expertise is not a natural category, eve-
ryone should be accorded equal expertise over every technical question. Collins
and Evans argue that this is plainly absurd and that some better normative guide-
lines for defining relevant expertise are necessary. The dispute, in part, is about
whether S&TS scholars actually take the position that Collins and Evans ascribe to
them.
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S&TS scholar was cited in the Daubert opinion, although one can fairly
debate whether it was in fact a "sincere" citation or an "opportunistic" one
(that is, a cynical or ignorant use of an authority to support a proposition
that did not actually accord with the author's intent).3 6 There are several
reasons for S&TS interest in expert evidence problems. First, the practical
problem facing the Daubert Court-how to evaluate the trustworthiness of
expert evidence-is a problem over which both scholars allied with the
field of S&TS37 and more conventional philosophers of science might be
considered to have some disciplinary 'jurisdiction," although, as I will ar-
gue below, there are also strands within both fields that tend toward dis-
36. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993); see also
Edmond & Mercer, Conjectures, supra note 17 (arguing that legal citations to philos-
ophy of science endorse philosophical views generally considered outmoded
among philosophers and that there are few legal citations to sociology of science);
Gary Edmond & David Mercer, The Invisible Branch: The Authority of Science Studies in
Expert Evidence Jurisprudence, in EXPERTISE IN REGULATION AND LAw 197 (Edmond
ed., 2004) (arguing that this citation, as well as others to S&TS, all use S&TS au-
thorities to support points not intended by authors and generally inconsistent with
S&TS). These articles incidentally predate the citation of the author's work in
several cases, at least some of which make points consistent with my intent (United
States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d. 261 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael,J., dissenting)) and perhaps
even with generally held S&TS views. See generally United States v. Kincade, 379
F.3d 813, 874 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). S&TS scholars, as well as
historians of science at least loosely associated with S&TS also signed amicus curiae
briefs that were filed in Daubert but not cited in the text of the opinion. See Brief of
Amici Curiae of Physicians, Scientists and Historians of Science in Support of Peti-
tioners, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1992 WL 12006437 (1992);
Brief of Amici Curiae Daryl E. Chubin, Ph.D. Edward J. Hackett, Ph.D. David
Michael Ozonoff, M.D., M.P.H. Richard W. Clapp, Sc.D., M.P.H., in Support of
Petitioners, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1992 WL 12006332
(1993).
37. Defining the field of S&TS is problematic. A literal definition would hold
that S&TS would include anyone who studies science and technology from any
scholarly disciplinary perspective. Moreover, S&TS is widely understood to be an
interdisciplinary endeavor and to be an outgrowth of the social science, the hu-
manities or both. At the same time, however, it is undeniable that the term
"S&TS" has come to be associated with something more specific that would be
closer to a particular intellectual movement or school of thought than to a generic
term for any study of the institutions of science and technology from any discipline
or perspective. This movement is generally associated with the sociology of scien-
tific knowledge, or even more specifically with "the strong programme in the soci-
ology of scientific knowledge," and it is to this movement that scholars often refer
when they talk about S&TS or "science studies." See Haack, supra note 17. As I
have noted elsewhere, this ambiguity can be problematic, especially when S&TS
itself becomes a subject of Daubert inquiry. In such circumstances, S&TS cannot
possibly be defined as an intellectual movement (to do so would be akin to defin-
ing "chemistry" intellectually, i.e. as people who believe in certain chemical theo-
ries, rather than as people who study the chemical makeup of matter). But, there
is sufficient disagreement among scholars who study science that, if S&TS is de-
fined broadly and generically, it becomes very difficult to make general statements
about the field's view on anything, including such fundamental issues as the nature
of science itself. Especially pronounced and best known in this regard is the disa-
greement between many philosophers of science and many sociologists of science
over generally "realist" or "relativist" views of scientific knowledge. See id.
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interest in this problem. Second, social and institutional actors' attempts to
define the limits of scientific knowledge are inherently interesting to S&TS
scholars-they are data to us. Thus, the law's attempt to limn scientific
knowledge has become a topic of study, albeit a relatively small one, within
S&TS. 38 The final reason, perhaps the least significant motivation, is that
some scholars may believe that the S&TS knowledge itself-that is, social
scientific knowledge about science, technology and expertise-might actu-
ally be useful to legal actors faced with expert evidence problems. It is this
last point that, at least in part, motivates Professors Caudill and LaRue's
book No Magic Wand, as well as my own work in this area.
Much of the early S&TS Daubert scholarship considered whether
Daubert "got science right." Did Daubert, in other words, evince an accurate
understanding of the enterprise of scientific (and expert) knowledge-mak-
ing, or at least an understanding informed by the latest and best social
science research on the issue? The answer, explicated in perhaps the
greatest detail in the collected works of the teams of Professor Caudill and
his collaborators, Professors Redding and LaRue, and Professors Edmond
and Mercer, was "no."3 9 Of course, one need not have been an S&TS
scholar to find Daubert's understanding of science lacking. For instance,
while the thrust of Professors Haack and Schwartz's critiques are quite dif-
ferent, both found the explicit and implicit philosophy of science con-
tained in Daubert to be inconsistent, incoherent and outmoded.40
Professors Caudill and Redding, in famously41 calling Daubert 'junk philos-
ophy of science," 4 2 were making a different point. They faulted Daubert
not only for using outmoded philosophy of science, but also for ignoring
the contributions of history, sociology and anthropology of science-in a
word, S&TS-to the discussion of expert evidence.
Most evidence scholars have tended to accept Daubert's supposed phi-
losophy of science at face value. 43 Whether they did so because that was
the philosophy of science to which they adhered or simply because that
was the Daubert Court's philosophy of science was not always entirely clear.
38. The best known work in this regard is undoubtedly SHEILAJASANOFF, SCI-
ENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA (1995). Another
excellent more recent study is TAL GOLAN, LAws OF MEN AND LAws OF NATURE
(2004). The book under discussion in this symposium, is, of course, another con-
tribution to this literature, although in contrast to the other works it is less situated
within S&TS than it is an attempt to bridge S&TS and legal literatures. See CAUDILL
& LARUE, supra note 4.
39. See, e.g., CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 4; Edmond & Mercer, Conjectures,
supra note 17.
40. See generally Haack, supra note 17; Adina Schwartz, A "Dogma of Empiricism"
Revisited: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the
Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United States, 10 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 149 (1997).
41. It is no insult for Professors Caudill and Redding to acknowledge that this
is perhaps an overstatement. What I mean is "famously" within the small commu-
nity of scholars who think about scientific evidence and law.
42. Caudill & Redding, supra note 17.
43. See Edmond & Mercer, The Invisible Branch, supra note 36.
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It should be clear now, based on the discussion in Part II, that this debate
to some extent misses the point. It does not matter whether Popper, or
Daubert, "got science right" because Daubert is not about science. It is
about the reliability and admissibility of evidence. The Supreme Court
was not really doing philosophy of science, at least not in the sense that
Popper was. It was, to be sure, confusing, and perhaps even pretentious,
of them to cite philosophy of science, but, nonetheless, it would probably
be more true to say they were not doing philosophy of science than to say
they were doing it badly.
It should be noted that, at the same time, the best known S&TS legal
scholar, Professor Jasanoff, offered a more generous reading of Daubert.
Jasanoff was perhaps more willing to read the contributions of S&TS be-
tween the lines of the Daubert text. Daubert's notorious vagueness made it
possible for one to, in a sense, make facts on the ground by claiming room
for S&TS in the Daubert opinion. 44 Professor Haack's conclusion is not all
that different in that, after amply deconstructing Daubert's philosophy of
science, she concludes that its philosophical inconsistency does not matter
all that much and should not distract us from more important issues at
hand.4 5
In sum, while legal scholars, philosophers of science and S&TS can
find much to quibble with, both in Daubert and amongst themselves, none
of them seems to make a particularly strong argument that these quibbles
matter all that much for the central practical matter at hand: the problem
of expert evidence. Most scholars, from Professor Jasanoff to Professor
Haack, advocate a generally pragmatist approach to this problem.
46
Professors Caudill and LaRue's book, No Magic Wand, is indeed remarka-
bly pragmatist in orientation.
47
IV. THE "DAUBERT FACToRS"
Another area in which both S&TS and philosophy of science have
made contributions is in criticizing the so-called "Daubert factors," the now
notorious four-part "checklist" (that the Court warns judges not to treat as
a checklist) 48 which purports to assist courts in determining whether prof-
fered evidence is "reliable." S&TS scholars and philosophers of science
have criticized the factors for being internally inconsistent, overly Popper-
ian and unworkable. My view, as articulated above, is that the argument
that the factors constitute poor philosophy of science largely misses the
point because the trial judge's task is not the philosophers'. Yet, this still
44. SeeJASANOFF, supra note 38.
45. See Haack, supra note 17.
46. See generally id.; Sheila Jasanoff, Just Evidence: The Limits of Science in the
Legal Process, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 328 (2006).
47. See generally CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 4.
48. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (U.S. 1993)
("[W]e do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test.").
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does not excuse the factors. I think it has become clear with the passage
of time that the principal harm of the factors is that they have come to
overwhelm the concept they were supposed to elucidate: reliability.
49
Rather than being read as they were written, as an illustration of one possi-
ble way to make a reliability inquiry, the Daubert factors have come to be
read as a four-pronged test of admissibility (not reliability) and have en-
couraged actors to almost forget about the notion of reliability altogether.
That this would occur was perhaps inevitable: the Court was at best naive if
it believed that the Daubert factors would not become a four-pronged test.
But, in any case, I have come to believe that the Court might have been
wiser to state that admissibility required a two-prong test-relevance and
reliability-and left it at that.
V. FIT
I have tried to argue that many of the disagreements that characterize
Daubert scholarship are more apparent than real. In this section, I will
focus on one concept that, in my view, unites rather than divides scholars
who think about scientific evidence. That concept has been characterized
in many different ways, but it was succinctly characterized by the Daubert
Court as "fit."50 By "fit," I mean whether the expert testimonial claim is
appropriately supported by evidence. The issue is not whether a given
expert can muster evidence supporting her ability to make some, legally
admissible, testimonial claim, but rather, whether she can muster evidence
supporting her ability to make precisely the testimonial claim that she will
give.
An examination of the Daubert literature, both the legal literature and
the literature related to S&TS or philosophy of science, shows that a wide
variety of scholars who generally would be thought to disagree about many
issues share a common view that "fit" is matter of crucial importance.
Scholars as diverse as Professor Imwinkelried, 51 Professor Black,52 Profes-
49. A quick glance at the legal literature shows that scholars' use of Justice
Rehnquist's characterization of the four prongs as dicta has decreased as Daubert
became more familiar and accepted with the passage of time. See id. at 600 (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting).
50. See id. at 600; United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir.
1985).
51. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Relativity of Reliability, 34 SETON HALL L.
REv. 269, 277 (2004) ("The degree of allowable definiteness of the expert's final
opinion should vary with the reliability foundation laid by the expert's
proponent.").
52. See generally Bert Black, Focus on Science, Not Checklists, 39 TRIAL 26 (Dec.
2003) ("Focus on the specifics of an expert's opinion, not just the field of
expertise.").
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sor Nance,5 1 Professor Berger,5 4 Professor Beecher-Monas, 55 Professor
Faigman 56 and Professors Gross and Mnookin 57 all appear to agree on the
crucial importance of fit. Furthermore, it is difficult to find scholars who
argue the opposite position-that fit should not matter.58
Perhaps the most thought-through view is that of Professor Friedman,
who coins the useful term "over-claiming" to refer to instances in which
expert witnesses exaggerate the probative value of the knowledge claims. 59
Professor Friedman notes that the Daubert binary admissibility framework
is of little use in controlling this problem. Its sole remedy, the "axe-wield-
ing demarcationist" 60 one of exclusion of evidence, will generally appear
to judges to be too draconian a sanction for a little over-claiming, espe-
cially when they have already, in an admissibility ruling, committed them-
selves to the position that the evidence is reliable and therefore
admissible. Moreover, Professor Friedman usefully considers the logical
53. See Nance, supra note 11, at 253. Nance notes that:
The use of a dichotomous concept of reliability, whether or not founded
on deference to a non-legal discipline, simply poses too many problems.
These problems, in turn, encourage an epistemically invasive use of ad-
missibility to monitor the weight of the evidence. It is time to turn away
from that kind of thinking and try another tack, one that draws on more
manageable comparative reliability assessments that build on a grada-
tional concept of reliability.
Id.
54. See Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings: Questions
Daubert Does Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1140 (2003) ("Admissibility
and sufficiency determinations rest on more than satisfaction of a reliability com-
ponent; they require careful attention to what the evidence proves and how the
trier of fact will use it.").
55. See Erica Beecher-Monas, A Ray of Light for Judges Blinded by Science: Triers of
Science and Intellectual Due Process, 33 GA. L. REv. 1047, 1062 (1999). ("[S]cientific
reliability is not an all-or-nothing proposition, but rather depends on the applica-
tion of the evidence and the acceptable risk of error.").
56. See David L. Faigman, Expert Evidence in flatland: The Geometry of a World
Without Scientific Culture, 34 SETON HALL L. REv. 255, 258 (2004) ("[D]isclaim[ing]
any intention to transform reliability into a dichotomous variable .. ").
57. See generally Samuel Gross & Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Information and
Expert Evidence: A Preliminary Taxonomy, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 141 (2004) ("As
important as an examination of method, however, and much less noted, is another
dimension: the degree of certainty that the expert posits in what she offers.").
58. Professor Kaye and co-authors argue persuasively that "fit" is generally im-
plied in any appropriate deployment of the notion of validity. They concede, how-
ever, that "Daubert's reference to 'fit' serves as an important reminder that the
'scientific validity' of a technique or instrument depends on the use to which it is
put." DAVID H. KAVE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE, §6.3.1 (2004).
59. See Friedman, supra note 7. Friedman explains:
Perhaps, though the problem is that the expert witness over-claimed the
significance of the serological result. If that is the problem, then the solu-
tion would not be to exclude evidence of the underlying serological phe-
nomenon, but to try to prevent the over-claiming, or at least to ensure
that the jury is not misled by it. It does not seem to me that the Daubert
framework is of much help here.
60. Haack, supra note 11, at 248.
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extent of the emphasis on fit by taking the counterintuitive position that
evidence that is wrong more often than it is right can nonetheless have
probative value (and, therefore, should be admissible), provided only that
the fact finder is properly informed of the evidence's reliability. 6 1
Despite all these pronouncements, the paeans to "fit" are almost hom-
ilies; scholars do not say much about fit, other than that they are in favor
of it. This is perhaps not surprising as a consequence of the issues dis-
cussed earlier; most scholars view admissibility demarcation as homolo-
gous with the demarcation of science from pseudo-science and, therefore,
focus on demarcation rather than assessment of fit. What I want to pro-
pose here is a shift of focus away from the overemphasized issue of demar-
cation and toward the neglected issue of fit. In some sense, I view "fit" as
another overlooked gem in the Daubert Trilogy, much as Professors
Denbeaux and Risinger have sought to elevate Kumho Tire's "task at hand"
requirement to a central place in the evaluation of expert evidence. 62
There is, of course, some resemblance between "fit" and the "task at
hand." Both concern an appropriate relationship between the evidentiary
claim and what Professors Denbeaux and Risinger usefully call the "war-
rants" for that claim. However, Professors Denbeaux and Risinger's focus
is primarily on the validity of the procedures that produce evidence. My
focus here is further downstream; it is on how that evidence is used in the
courtroom. Even valid procedures can produce invalid testimony, if the
testimony does not fit the warrants that support that testimony. Much sci-
entific evidence scholarship, including my own, has focused on the need
to validate forms of evidence that are used in court.63 I am becoming
convinced, however, that it is in testimony that "the rubber meets to road"
for the problem of the expert in law. The problem with experts for law is
not so much what the evidence says, but what the expert says to the fact
finder.
Hitherto, scholars and courts have largely focused on the validity of
evidence, seen in a dichotomous admissibility framework. Valid evidence
is admissible, invalid evidence inadmissible. What happens after admissi-
bility has largely been given short shrift, and experts are permitted to say
61. See Friedman, supra note 7. Professor Friedman acknowledges that this
argument also requires the assumption that it can shown or assumed that the relia-
bility of the evidence can be properly conveyed to the fact-finder and that the fact-
finder can appropriately integrate it with other evidence. As a factual matter, of
course, both of these are highly suspect assumptions, as Professor Friedman
acknowledges.
62. See generally Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 5; Imwinkelried, supra note
26.
63. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (2d ed. 2002); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Coming to
Grips with Scientific Research in Daubert's "Brave New World ": The Courts'Need to Appre-
ciate the Evidentiary Differences between Validity and Proficiency Studies, 61 BROOK. L.
REV. 1247 (1995); lmwinkelried, The Meaning of "Appropriate Validation" supra note
25; Simon A. Cole, Is Fingerprint Identification Valid? Rhetorics of Reliability in Finger-
print Proponents'Discourse, 28J.L. & POL'Y 109 (2006).
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more or less anything about evidence deemed admissible, even if what
they say overstates (or understates) the probative value of the evidence. I
suggest that courts and scholars need to spend a lot more time thinking
about expert testimony and perhaps a little less time thinking about scien-
tific evidence.
VI. BRINGING THE STRANDS TOGETHER
What I want to argue, in sum, is that courts (and scholars) should not
be demarcating at all, but rather assessing fit. I would hypothesize that
more damage is done by "over-claiming"-by expert testimony that exag-
gerates its own probative value-than by evidence that is deemed admissi-
ble when it should not be. Gone would be the binary distinction between
admissible and inadmissible, reliable and unreliable evidence. In its stead
would be an evaluation of where particular evidentiary claims stand along
a continuum of trustworthiness. Most crucially, that evaluation would con-
trol not whether the evidence is heard, as in a Daubert-like binary admissi-
bility framework, but rather the nature of the testimonial claim that is
heard. In other words, judges would carefully calibrate the strength of the
testimonial claim to the strength of the warrants that support that claim.
My claim is that this is precisely what is missed in a binary admissibility
framework in which judges assume that their work is done once they have
ruled proffered evidence admissible or inadmissible. I suggest that in this
framework, weak evidence that is ruled admissible probably routinely over-
claims. Meanwhile, as Professor Friedman notes, fact finders may be de-
prived of weak evidence that nonetheless might have probative value as
long as it is restricted from over-claiming.
VII. FORENsIc EVIDENCE: A CASE STUDY IN OVER-CLAIMING
In this section, I will report on a provisional attempt to apply this
over-claiming framework to a problematic area of scientific evidence: fo-
rensic science or forensic evidence. The choice of forensic evidence does
not merely reflect the fact that it is the area of scientific evidence with
which I am most familiar. Over-claiming has already been identified as a
particular problem with forensic evidence by a number of scholars
(though they do not necessarily use that term). Over-claiming has long
been identified as a problem for microscopic hair comparison. 6 4 The Na-
tional Research Council's (NRC) report on Comparative Bullet Lead Anal-
ysis (CBLA) revealed rampant over-claiming over the course of the nearly
64. See Berger, supra note 54, at 1132 ("We know from cases and news ac-
counts that hair examiners often embellish their testimony with probability esti-
mates based on their personal experience for which there is no empirical basis.");
Friedman, supra note 7, at 1063; see also generally Peter Neufeld, The (Near) Irrele-
vance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 Am. J. PUB.
HEALTH S107 (2005); Clive A. Stafford Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic Hair
Comparison Analysis: Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil, 27
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 227 (1996).
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forty-year history of FBI testimony concerning results of that assay, includ-
ing the completely unfounded claim that two analytically indistinguishable
bullets "must have come from the same box or from another box that
would have been made by the same company on the same day."6 5 Indeed,
much of the scholarly attention devoted to CBLA and the NRC report has
focused on the very interesting statistical issues raised by CBLA evidence
and the FBI's and NRC's alleged failure to deal with them adequately.
66
Nevertheless, in some sense these sexy statistical issues 67 have induced
many scholars to miss the forest for the trees. Setting the issues of statisti-
cal inference aside, the CBLA episode can be read as a simple story of
over-claiming: the testimonial use of claims well beyond what empirical
evidence did, or even could, support. And, indeed, it is in the testimony
where the damage was done. The NRC report documents sworn govern-
ment witnesses testifying that a bullet recovered from a crime scene "must
have come from the same box" as a bullet found in the defendant's posses-
sion "or from another box that would have been made by the same com-
pany on the same day," a claim that is unsustainable no matter what one
thinks about the value of CBLA.68
Latent print identification is perhaps the only discipline for which
over-claiming is institutionalized. Because professional guidelines mandate
that the only inclusionary conclusion latent print examiners may offer in
their sworn testimony is that of "individualization" (the claim that the de-
fendant or suspect's skin is the source of the latent or crime-scene print to
the exclusion of all other possible sources in the universe), 69 and such
65. National Research Council, Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence, Report in Brief
(2004).
66. See generally Michael 0. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, Compositional Analysis of
Bullet Lead as Forensic Evidence, 13J.L. & POL'Y 119 (2005); EdwardJ. Imwinkelnied
& William A. Tobin, Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis (CBLA) Evidence: Valid Inference
or Ipse Dixit?, 28 OKLA. CrTY U. L. REv. 43 (2003); David H. Kaye, Bullet-proofing the
NRC Bullet Lead Report: Should Science Committees Make Legal Findings?, 46
JURUMETRICSJ. 91 (2005); William C. Thompson, Analyzing the Relevance and Admissi-
bility of Bullet Lead Evidence: Did the NRC Report Miss the Target?, 46JURIMETRICSJ. 65
(2005); see also Alicia L. Carriquiry, Good Riddance: Further ArguingAgainst CABL as a
Forensic Tool, 19 CHANCE (2006); Clifford Spiegelman & Karen Kafadar, Data Meth-
ods, Materials, and Scientific Responsibility, 19 CHANCE (2006); Simon A. Cole et al., A
Retail Sampling Approach to Assess Impact of Geographic Concentrations on Probative Value
of Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis, 4 LAw, PROBABILITv AND RISK 199 (2005).
67. If such a concept is even possible.
68. National Research Council, Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence, Report in Brief
(2004).
69. See Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis Study and Tech-
nology, Standards for Conclusions, J. Forensic Identification (2004), available at
http://www.swgfast.org/Standards forConclusions_ver_l_0.pdf; Scientific Work-
ing Group on Friction Ridge Analysis Study and Technology, Friction Ridge Exami-
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claims are obviously unsustainable, all inclusionary latent print testimony
is over-claimed. 70
Whether latent print evidence is the only forensic discipline that en-
joys institutionalized over-claiming is currently the subject of a vociferous
debate among students of tool mark analysis.7' It is clear that tool mark
examiners sometimes testify that the correspondence between a crime
scene tool mark and a test tool mark somehow warrants them to testify the
object that made the test tool mark is the object that made the crime scene
mark. Further, they claim that all other tools in the universe-even the
next consecutive tool produced on the assembly line-can be eliminated
as potential sources of the crime scene mark. Courts have noted that this
is an "extraordinary" claim in its epistemological strength and probative
value, and they have noted that it is particularly extraordinary given the
paucity of evidence supporting it.72 The ultimate resolution of this de-
bate, which concerns precise interpretations of the wording of the Associa-
tion of Firearms and Toolmark Examiners' "Theory of Identification," is
less important for our purposes than the mere fact that the issue remains
ambiguous. The very fact that there is debate over the nature of properly
framed tool mark testimony illustrates not only that another professional
group may be engaging in systematic over-claiming in our courts, but also
the casualness with which courts, scholars and practitioners approach mat-
ters of testimonial nuance in their eagerness to focus on Daubert's dichoto-
mous admissible/inadmissible distinction.
Forensic odontologists have also been accused of over-claiming. In
one case, the witness testified, not only that a crime scene bite mark was
consistent with the defendant's dentition, but also that no other dentition
among the 3.5 million inhabitants of the Detroit metropolitan area would
also be found consistent with this particular bite mark.73 As the Sixth Cir-
70. For further discussion, see William C. Thompson & Simon A. Cole, Psycho-
logical Aspects of Forensic Identification Evidence, in PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY FOR THE
COURTS (Costanzo et al. eds., 2006); Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Finger-
print Admissibility Ruling from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 1189, 1223 (2004). It is curious that Professor Friedman, from whom I
derive this notion of over-claiming, failed to recognize the dangers of institutional-
ized over-claiming in latent print identification when he claimed: "If the treatment
of fingerprint evidence does not square with Daubert, as some . . . have suggested
* . . I believe the problem lies with Daubert rather than with the way fingerprint
evidence has been treated for decades." Friedman, supra note 7, at n.26. As for
Professor Friedman's claim that "[flingerprint identification . . . seems to be a
trivial source of mistaken identification," based on Innocence Project data, that
issue is treated extensively in Cole. See Cole, supra note 15, at 1025.
71. See generally Adina Schwartz, A Systemic Challenge to the Reliability and Admis-
sibility of Firearms and Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 1
(2005); Ronald Nichols, The Scientific Foundation of Firearms and Tool Mark Identifica-
tion-A Response to Recent Challenges, California Ass'n of Criminalists News 8 (2nd
Quarter, 2006).
72. United States v. Green, 405 F.Supp.2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 2005); see also
Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2001).
73. See Ege v. Yukins, 485 F.3d 364 (2007).
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cuit Court of Appeals, and the state court before it, noted, this testimony
exaggerated the probative value of the evidence not merely because the
witness had not actually observed the dentition of those 3.5 million indi-
viduals, but also because the witness lacked any data from which to even
make responsible estimate of the rarity of the observed features of the bite
mark in a population of that size.7 4
Indeed, some scholars have noted that the weakest areas of forensic
science appear to be the most prone to over-claiming, something they view
as "ironic" that might equally be viewed as entirely unsurprising and per-
haps even as a predictable outcome of the Daubert framework. 75 And yet,
even a discipline with sufficient data to support very precisely formulated
testimonial claims and forensic DNA profiling is not immune to over-
claiming. For several years now, forensic scientists have debated the pro-
priety of rounding very low random match probabilities into testimonial
claims of "source attribution"-that the defendant "is" the source of the
crime-scene DNA sample.
76
A. A Preliminary Empirical Study of Over-claiming
The evidence concerning over-claiming in the previous section is gen-
erally anecdotal or indirect. Arguments concerning over-claiming are typi-
cally supported by reference to notorious cases, and such cases may not
necessarily be common or representative. Another method of docu-
menting over-claiming is to examine policy statements, promulgated stan-
dards or other documents generated by professional organizations or
other standard-setting bodies. My argument concerning institutionalized
over-claiming by latent print examiners and perhaps tool mark examiners
can be supported by reference to such documents.
77
74. Id.
75. See John 1. Thornton & Joseph L. Peterson, The General Assumptions and
Rationale of Forensic Identification, in SCIENCE IN THE LAw: FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES 1,
25 (Faigman, et al. eds., 2002) ("It is ironic that those areas of forensic science that
have real underlying data offer more modest statements of individualization, while
those limited to subjective or impressionistic data make the strongest statements,
sometimes of absolute certainty.").
76. See generally Bruce Budowle, Source Attribution of a Forensic DNA Profile, 2
FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMUNICATIONS (2000); John Buckleton, Population Genetic
Models, in FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE INTERPRETATION 65 (Buckleton et al. eds.,
2005); Bruce S. Weir, DNA Match and Profile Probabilities: Comment on Budowle et al.
(2000); Fund and Hu (2000), 3 FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMUNICATIONS (2001).
77. See Nichols, supra note 71; Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge
Analysis Study and Technology, Standards for Conclusions (2003). Among latent
print examiners, I can also show that institutionalized over-claiming does not just
exist at the center of the latent print community; the principle has trickled down
to the local level. For example, the New Hampshire State Police Laboratory latent
print protocol states that testimony should be given as follows: "The latent impres-
sion developed on exhibit __ has been identified as the fingerprint impression
of ." New Hampshire State Police Forensic Laboratory, Latent Print Exam-
ination: Interpretation and Reporting of Conclusions, IDU-001-03 (2005). The report
form of another laboratory contained the preprinted words: "After examination of
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There are, of course, good reasons for using such documents as in-
dicators of the nature of testimonial claims used by the witnesses who be-
long to the relevant disciplines and/or organizations. Although the
standards promulgated by these bodies are not typically "binding" in any
strict sense, they presumably do have some persuasive authority with those
expert witnesses who either belong to the relevant organizations or con-
sider themselves members of the relevant disciplines.
78
American trial practice, however, is a vast and disparate body of activ-
ity that is incompletely and sporadically reported. Therefore, there is little
way of knowing to what extent the pronouncements of professional orga-
nizations and self-appointed standard-setting bodies constrain the testi-
mony of actual expert witnesses in American courtrooms. And, this, after
all, is the heart of the matter: what witnesses say to juries every day all over
the country clad in the mantle of expertise. Once again, in my view, the
essence of forensic science is not merely what is done but, at least as impor-
tandy, what is said.
Despite the importance of the issue, determining what expert wit-
nesses say in American courtrooms is far from an easy matter. No organi-
zation systematically, or even unsystematically, collects such data. The
law's historical convention of treating appellate opinions, rather than trial
transcripts, as the site at which law "happens" has led to a situation in
which-the far from minor manner of publication, unpublication and
depublication aside 79-transparent, fully searchable records are kept of
appellate decisions, but almost no searchable databases of trial transcripts
exist. It is true that some proprietary trial transcript databases do exist,
and it so happens that some of these focus on scientific evidence. But
these proprietary databases tend to focus on the scientific evidence that is
used in civil, not criminal, litigation.80
this evidence the latent prints obtained from - and the
were made by one and the same person." Los Angeles Police Department, Scien-
tific Investigation Division, Latent Print Section, Forensic Print Comparison Report
(1990), on file with the author.
78. Some guidelines may have even more authority than this. For example,
resolutions of the International Association for Identification echo the point made
by SWGFAST above, banning conclusions less then "individualization." Interna-
tional Association for Identification, Resolution V, 30 IDENTIFICATION NEWS 3
(1980); International Association for Identification, Resolution VII, 29 IDENTIFICA-
TION NEWS 1 (1979). The IAI's somewhat different language, banning "probabilis-
tic" identifications, essentially amounts to the same thing, but it also carries with it
an implicit threat of professional sanction, such as expulsion from the IAI. Al-
though the LAl has expelled members for other reasons, I am not aware of any case
of expelling a member for expressing a probabilistic conclusion, even when such a
conclusion has been reported in a published legal opinion. See Michigan v. Bal-
lard, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 547 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2003); see also Latent
Print Certification Actions, 55J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 658 (2005) (explaining rea-
sons why other IAI members were expelled).
79. See, e.g., Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of PrivateJudg-
ing in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN, L. REv. 1435 (2004).
80. See, e.g., Daubert Tracker,http://www.dauberttracker.com.
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In order to gain a more precise understanding of the semantic nature
of forensic expert testimony, I have begun collecting trial transcripts of
criminal cases in which forensic expert evidence is presented. I began
with latent print evidence, the area with which I have the most familiarity,
but I am actively collecting transcripts in other areas as well. The analysis
presented here derives from a set of thirty-four latent print transcripts,
which comprise a non-representative opportunistic sample. I acquired
some transcripts through my work as a scholar interested in latent print
evidence, as a consultant to criminal defendants in cases involving latent
print evidence, and as an expert witness on the validity or lack thereof of
latent print evidence in such cases. In addition I also received some unso-
licited transcripts directly from convicted inmates who were aware of my
work on latent print evidence. Fifteen of the thirty-four transcripts were
gathered in this manner. I acquired additional transcripts by soliciting
transcripts on defense attorney listservs and by directly emailing attorneys
of my acquaintance who were interested in forensic evidence issues. Sev-
enteen of the thirty-four transcripts were gathered by this method. Finally,
two trial transcripts involving fingerprint evidence from high profile tri-
als-United States v. McVeigh and United States v. Nichols-were publicly
available on the internet (see Appendix for details on the transcripts).
Any form of spoken, sworn testimony concerning an inclusionary con-
clusion drawn from latent print evidence was considered suitable for inclu-
sion. The intent was to understand what probative conclusions expert
witnesses uttered in sworn testimony. Thus, the transcripts derive from
trials, preliminary hearings and depositions. Affidavits, such as the notori-
ous "100% identification" affidavit used to wrongly arrest attorney Bran-
don Mayfield in the Madrid bombing,8 1 were not included. The thirty-
four transcripts derive from twelve states and from federal court. One
transcript derives from a foreign source, the state of Western Australia.
The transcripts derive from criminal cases involving a variety of charges,
ranging from burglary to mass murder (e.g., United States v. McVeigh), from
obscure to extremely high-profile cases (McVeigh again). The dates the
transcripts were generated range from 1986 to 2006. The mean year is
2000.
Obviously, the transcripts analyzed here derive from an opportunistic
sample, and no claims can be made concerning their representativeness.
Methods of gathering a more representative sample can be imagined, but
they would be quite unwieldy.8 2 The important question, however, is
81. For further discussion, see Cole, supra note 15; Simon A. Cole, Brandon
Mayfield, Suspect, in SUSPECT 172 (Knechtel ed., 2005); Simon A. Cole, The Preva-
lence and Potential Causes of Wrongful Conviction by Fingerprint, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REv. 39 (2006); William C. Thompson & Simon A. Cole, Lessons from the Brandon
Mayfield Case, 29 THE CHAMPION 42 (Apr. 2005); Steven T. Wax & Christopher J.
Schatz, A Multitude of Errors: The Brandon Mayfield Case, 28 THE CHAMPION 6 (Sept./
Oct., 2004).
82. It would be necessary to assemble a set of representative jurisdictions, de-
fine a representative time period, and examine all criminal transcripts for the pres-
824 [Vol. 52: p. 803
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whether the transcripts analyzed here are likely to overstate or understate
the quality of latent print testimony as it exists in the universe not captured
by these transcripts. Because my argument is generally critical of the cur-
rent testimonial practice concerning latent print evidence-in that I claim
there is routine, institutionalized over-claiming-we need only worry about
the possibility that this data understates the quality of testimony. If this
data overstates the quality of testimony, and if I have erred, I have erred in
favor of my adversary.
The "quality" of expert testimony is not an obviously measurable
thing. Essentially, what we would be concerned about is that the testimony
found in this data set is somehow "worse"-less responsible, less defensi-
ble-than the typical testimony given during the comparable time period
in comparable jurisdictions. There are several reasons to conclude that
this data set is, if anything, likely to overstate the "quality," however that is
measured, of latent print expert testimony. First, the transcripts are rela-
tively recent in origin. The mean year of generation is 2000. Latent print
testimony has been offered in U.S. courts for almost a century. -8 3 Al-
though defendants challenged the evidence when it was first introduced,
by the 1920s the admissibility and presumed reliability were widely sanc-
tioned by the courts.84 Over the course of the twentieth century, latent
print examiners have remarked on defense attorneys' reluctance to chal-
lenge evidence. 8 5 In 1999, however, a criminal defendant challenged the
admissibility of latent print expert evidence under Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.8 6 This challenge stimulated more admissibility chal-
lenges, and these provoked a fair amount of notice within the latent print
community8 7 and some consternation about whether the technique might
be ruled inadmissible under Daubert.88 There was even a brief scare when
one court did limit the admissibility of latent print evidence before revers-
ing itself.8 9 Thus, if ever within nearly a century of expert testimony, la-
ence of testimony concerning latent print evidence. The "yield" of such a method
would probably be quite low and thus require examining a large number of tran-
scripts. This would be quite laborious given that searchable databases of trial tran-
scripts are rare.
83. See People v. Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077 (Ill. 1911).
84. See SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND
CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 206 (2001).
85. See 6 FINGER PRINT AND IDENTIFICATION MAGAZINE 2 (1924); Andre A.
Moenssens, Testifying as a Fingerprint Witness, 54 FINGER PRINT AND IDENTIFICATION
MAGAZINE 3 (1972).
86. See generally United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004); Robert
Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint "Science" is Revealed, 75 S.
CAL. L. REv. 605 (2002).
87. See, e.g., David L. Grieve, Rocking the Cradle, 49 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION
719 (1999).
88. See, e.g., John P. Nielson, Are You Dead? Take this Test and Find Out, 53 J.
FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 1 (2003).
89. See United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002);
United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
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tent print examiners were going to be careful about how they phrased
their conclusions, it would have been after 1999. Because half of the tran-
scripts date from 2000 or after, we should expect them to represent rela-
tively carefully phrased testimony.
Second, the transcripts derive from relatively serious crimes. Of the
eighteen transcripts for which the charge can be determined, half derive
from homicide cases. Homicide cases represent around one percent of
felony cases prosecuted nationwide. 90 Thus, the data set oversamples seri-
ous cases. All other things being equal, the quality of both legal represen-
tation and expert testimony is likely to be higher the more serious the
case. Similarly, with two of the thirty-four cases representing very high-
profile cases, the data set surely oversamples high-profile cases. Again, all
other things being equal, the quality of both representation and testimony
should be relatively high in high-profile cases. Although some forensic
scientists have claimed that latent print analysis is more error-prone in
high-profile cases,9 1 this claim has not been extended to sloppy phrasing
of testimony. 92 Finally, with six out of thirty-four cases, the federal juris-
diction is also surely overrepresented in the data set. Again, all other
things being equal, the quality of both representation and expert testi-
mony may be expected to be generally higher in the federal jurisdiction.
This is especially true in the area of forensic evidence, where the expert
witnesses very likely come from such vaunted organizations as the FBI, the
Secret Service, the ATF, the Postal Police, Homeland Security and the IRS.
Third, the level of experience of the examiners testifying was not re-
markably low. Of the cases in which the level of the examiner's experi-
ence was stated in the transcript, the average number of years of
experience was fifteen. The latent print community generally uses experi-
ence as a rough measure of ability,9 3 given the absence of any other mea-
sure (other than certification), although the facile equation of ability with
90. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Case
Processing Statistics, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cases.htm (last up-
dated Sept. 28, 2004).
91. See generally Robert B. Stacey, A Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint Individual-
ization in the Madrid Train Bombing Case, 54J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 706 (2004).
92. Moreover, the claim is unsupported. See generally Cole, supra note 81;
Thompson & Cole, supra note 81.
93. Jon S. Byrd, Confirmation Bias, Ethics, and Mistakes in Forensics, 56J. FOREN-
SIC IDENTIFICATION 511, 520 (2006) ("[T]he training and experience of the exam-
iner becomes the vital element in the identification process.") (emphasis added);
Pat A. Wertheim, The Connection: Faulty Forensics (NPR radio broadcast, June 10,
2004), available at http://www.theconnection.org/shows/2004/06/20040610 b_
main.asp (questionably interpreting Llera Plaza II as holding, "[t]he reliability of
the examiner through training, experience, and testing is the key to the reliability
of the evidence they [sic] present in court."); see also Llera Plaza, 188 F.Supp. 2d at
549. One of the ways in which this is manifested is through the frequent reference
to "training and experience" as warrant for the expert's claim.
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experience has been questioned by some.9 4 In general, however, it does
not seem plausible to claim that the examiners represented in this data set
under-represent the level of experience of latent print examiners testify-
ing in the U.S. in recent years.
Finally, the method of collection itself is a rough indicator of gener-
ally high quality of justice. First, the trial transcript is in the possession of
an attorney, meaning that someone is appealing the conviction. Second,
the possessor of that transcript either: (1) subscribes to a listserv, itself an
indicator of a relatively engaged attorney, and took the opportunity to re-
spond to an academic researcher's request for information without any
prospect of compensation; or (2) engaged the services of the author as a
consultant, indicating a relatively high level of engagement in the litiga-
tion. These may be considered rough measures of a case that is enjoying a
reasonably high level of representation, not cases from the backwoods 95
using latent print examiners out of touch with current practice. For all of
these reasons, it would seem safe to conclude that the transcripts do not
represent atypically "poor" expert testimony.
In analyzing the transcripts, I focused on what I call the "source attri-
bution moment," the moment at which the expert connected the latent
print to the defendant or the moment at which the expert identified the
defendant as the source of the latent print. This is the moment when the
latent print expert does his or her work: telling the jury that the defendant
is the source of an incriminating print. Generally speaking, this moment
should occur on direct examination, and for consistency purposes, I only
analyzed direct testimony even though cross examination yielded some
highly incriminatory statements in some cases.
Using a process of open coding,9 6 I read through the "source attribu-
tion moments" in several iterations to allow the data to suggest categories,
rather than imposing my own categories upon the data. This process
yielded three broad categories of testimony capable of encompassing all
thirty-four testimonies. A few testimonies fit in more than one category.
Note, however, that two categories would have been sufficient to encom-
pass all but three of the testimonies. The third category ("Identity")
should thereby be regarded as less significant than the other two.
B. About Identification Testimony
Latent print (or "fingerprint") evidence is perhaps best characterized
as "source attribution" evidence.97 The probative value of such evidence
typically lies in the identification of a particular individual as the source of
94. See Pat A. Wertheim, The Ability Equation, 46 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION
149 (1996).
95. Or, say, Philadelphia.
96. See ANSELM L. STRAUSS, QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
(1987).
97. See KEITH INMAN & NoRAH RUDIN, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF CRIMINALIS-
TICS: THE PROFESSION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 137 (2001); WILLIAM C. THOMPSON &
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trace evidence found at a crime scene. This is done through a finding of
consistency between that crime scene trace and a reference sample known
to come from that individual (typically because it was taken from the indi-
vidual while held in custody). For the past century or so, such evidence
has been offered in court for such forms of trace evidence as fingerprints,
bite marks, serology, hair and handwriting.98 During this past century,
there appears to have been relatively little systematic thought about how
testimony concerning such evidence should be given. There does not ap-
pear to have been any organized control over forensic expert testimony.
Nor did the courts appear to exercise much control, save the occasional
sanction when a witness went too far, such as by straying into the province
of the jury.99 Forensic expert witnesses testified in a variety of formula-
tions, most typically stating that the crime scene trace "matched" the
defendant.
This situation changed with the introduction of forensic DNA profil-
ing. As DNA typing developed, expert testimony evolved into what has
been called a "two-stage" form of testimony.10 0 The first stage was a state-
ment of consistency. Presumably such statements should have also in-
cluded the criteria by which traces were judged on consistency, an
accounting of any inconsistencies, an explanation of why it was still per-
missible to find the traces consistent and some measure of the "amount"
of consistency. The second was an estimate of rarity. Such statements
sought to convey the significance, or the probative value, of the finding of
consistency to the fact-finder by estimating the rarity of the features found
consistent in stage (1) in a given population. To use an obvious example,
an eyewitness sighting of a perpetrator fleeing in a Rolls Royce has a
higher probative value than the sighting of a perpetrator fleeing in a
Toyota because Rolls Royces are more rare. This general framework for
presenting forensic evidence to the fact finder commanded widespread
agreement and was endorsed by two NRC panels, 10 ' although there were,
and still are, fierce disputes over the details. 10 2
SIMON A. COLE, Psychological Aspects of Forensic Identification Evidence, in PSYCHOLOcI-
CAL TESTIMONY FOR THE COURTS (Costanzo et al. eds., 2006).
98. For an overview, see generally MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAw AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002); see also,
Clive A. Stafford Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic Hair Comparison Analysis:
Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 227 (1996) (analyzing hair evidence).
99. See, e.g., Stacy v. State, 292 P. 885 (Ok. 1930).
100. See Colin Aitken, Presentation at the Sackler Colloquium on Forensic Science:
The Nexus of Science and the Law (Nat'l Acad. of Sciences, Nov. 17, 2005), available at
http://progressive.playstream.com/nakfi/progressive/sackler/forensics/aitken/
aitken.html.
101. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EvI-
DENCE (Nat'l Acad. Press 1996).
102. See JAY ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE, LAW AND CONTROVERSY IN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DNA PROFILING; see also MICHAEL LYNCH ET AL., TRUTH MA-
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The dominance of the two-step model has led to a climate in which it
has become difficult to understand why anyone would want to present
source attribution evidence in any other way. Nonetheless, those disci-
plines that historically predate the development of forensic DNA profiling
remain committed to their traditional methods of characterizing evidence.
Primarily, this is because they lack the data with which to calculate the
estimates necessary to complete the second step.10 3 Even so, the implicit
contrast with DNA profiling has led to some discomfort with the match
language in the traditional source attributions disciplines. Bite mark ex-
aminers have been the most proactive in this regard, seeking to develop a
sort of linguistic scale of certainty along which judgments of consistency
could be calibrated. 10 4 The obvious question prompted when disciplines
that testify about "matches" are contrasted with forensic DNA profiling is:
what is meant by a "match"? Is a "match" an assertion that the reference
sample is consistent with trace, and nothing else could be consistent? Or, is it
an assertion that the reference sample is consistent, and some other num-
ber of objects in the world might also be consistent? Typically, this ambi-
guity inherent in the word "match" is not resolved in expert testimony (or
even necessarily in the witnesses' mind). 10 5 Of course, as evidence schol-
ars have noted, testimony about "matches" is unhelpful to fact-finders who
are unable to assess the probative value of the evidence without knowing
the rarity of the "match."
1 0 6
A statement such as "the latent print is not inconsistent with the
known print of the suspect" is, in my view, a scientifically defensible state-
ment to make about a latent print analysis. It is not false on its face; it
does not imply the existence of studies, data and conclusions that do not
exist (as does the statement, "[t]he latent print is consistent with the
known print of the suspect, and no other known print could be found
consistent"). Nevertheless, even this more scientifically defensible state-
ment serves the fact-finder poorly. The fact-finder still does not know how
many individuals in the relevant population can produce known prints
that would be deemed "not inconsistent" with the crime scene trace and,
therefore, cannot calculate the probative value of the evidence. The prob-
CHINE: THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF DNA FINGERPRINTING (Univ. of Chic. Press,
forthcoming).
103. For a discussion on latent prints, see generally CHRISTOPHE CHAMPOD ET
AL., FINGERPRINTS AND OTHER RIDGE SKIN IMPRESSIONS (2004); Christophe
Champod & Ian W. Evett, A Probabilistic Approach to Fingerprint Evidence, 51 J. FOREN-
SIC IDENTIFICATION 101 (2001).
104. See C. Michael Bowers, Identification from Bitemarks: Scientific Issues, in SCI-
ENCE IN THE LAw: FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES 244 (Faigman et al. eds., 2002).
105. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 97.
106. See generally Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence In An Age of DNA
Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 13 (2001);Judith A. McKenna et al., Reference Guide on
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lem with the evidence under Daubert thus becomes not its reliability, but its
relevance.
0 7
These issues notwithstanding, given that latent print examiners have
no data or methods with which to assess the rarity of the features that they
find consistent in their analyses, in my view the only defensible testimony
latent print examiners could give would be statements like the following:
"I was not able to exclude the defendant as the source of the
latent print."
"It is my opinion that the latent print and the known print may
have derived from a common source."
"Using a process whose accuracy is not known, I reached a con-
clusion that the latent print and the known print derived from a
common source."
"The consistencies between the latent print and the known print
show that potential donors of the latent print are the defendant
and an unknown number of other individuals."
These are not the sorts of statements I found in my analyses of actual
transcripts. The most carefully and precisely worded conclusion was with-
out question the following one:
"The latent print that appears on this lift, which is Government's
Exhibit 44, was made by the same individual whose inked finger-
print appears in the left ring finger block of the fingerprint card,
Government Exhibit Number 60, which bears the name Latrell
Lanthrom Gilchrist". l0
8
C. Categories of Testimony
1. Process Statements
Eighteen testimonies fit into a category I will call "Process statements"
because the witness characterized the evidence not in terms of probative
value, but as the outcome of process. Typically, the witnesses have told the
jury that they "identified" or "matched" the latent print "to" the defen-
dant. An example of such a "Process statement" is the following: "This
impression here, No. 3 upper, right-hand corner, No. 18, was identified to
the ink impression of Victor Reyes' left palm in this area here."1 0 9
In some ways, the "Process" category belies much of the discussion we
have had up to this point. Process statements are not really source attribu-
tion moments in that the expert never actually states that defendant is the
source of the crime scene trace. Nor do Process statements misstate the
107. 1 am grateful to Professor Jennifer Mnookin for making this point.
108. United States v. Gilchrist, 204 Fed. Appx. 258 (2006).
109. See Florida v. Reyes, Tr. Trans. at 49.
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probative value of the evidence; indeed, what is remarkable is that such
statements would seem, on their face, to have very little probative value or
perhaps no probative value at all. What does it mean for an expert witness
to say they "identified" a trace "to" the defendant? Or to have "matched"
the crime scene trace to a known sample from the defendant? It has often
been noted that the claim of a "match" is in itself meaningless, if not ac-
companied by any further information about how unusual is such
match.' 10 In addition, it is necessary to know the accuracy of this "match-
ing" or "identification" process. Absent such knowledge, the jury has no
way of assessing the probative value of a "match" or "identification."t1 1
Any statistically or logically informed evaluation of a Process statement-
which, of course, is not something we can expect from juries-would
prompt the questions: What is this Process by which the defendant was
"identified" (or "matched")? How accurate is it? How discriminating?
The Process statements do not say, and, therefore, the jury should not be
able to infer any probative value from them at all. Consider: it would be
one thing to "identify" a bloodstain "to" a defendant by visual analysis (the
defendant has a fresh wound), another to "identify" the bloodstain "to"
the defendant by serological analysis (same ABO blood type) and still an-
other to "identify" it "to" the defendant by DNA profiling. The probative
values of each "matching" process are wildly divergent, yet none of that
divergence is accounted for or communicated to the jury if all three
processes are characterized by nothing more than Process statements.
Of course, Process statements are not valueless, at least when they
concern latent print evidence. Common sense and numerous cases attest
that juries will find defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based
solely on latent print evidence.' 12 Something must be bestowing proba-
tive value on the evidence that is not discernible merely by reading the
expert's testimony on its face.
110. For a discussion of"matches," see supra note 106 and accompanying text.
111. See United States v. Green, 405 F.Supp.2d 104, 119 (D. Mass. 2005) (not-
ing that expert evidence may be excluded "because the factfinder has no informa-
tion about the likelihood of error in the opinions, and thus cannot adjust the
weight to be given to the evidence.")
112. See, e.g., Taylor v. Stainer, 31 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. 1994); People v. Riser,
305 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1956); People v. Adamson, 165 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1946); People v. Rami-
rez, 113 Cal. App. 204, 205-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931); People v. Atwood, 223 Cal.
App.2d 316 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); People v. Ang, 204 Cal. App.2d 553 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1962); People v. Wise, 199 Cal. App.2d 57, 60 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1962); People v. Beem, 192 Cal. App.2d 207 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (finger-
prints on dusty suitcase piled on top of show window and beneath hole cut in
ceiling where entry was made); People v. Massey, 196 Cal. App.2d 230, 232 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (fingerprint on inside of open bedroom window through
which burglar fled); People v. Rodis, 145 Cal. App.2d 44, 45-46 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1956) (fingerprints on outside of window that was nine-feet above ground and
through which entry was made); Grice v. State, 151 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Crim. App.
1941). But see Mikes v. Borg, 947 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1991); Ballard v. State, 923
So.2d 475 (Fla. 2006).
2007]
29
Cole: Where the Rubber Meets the Road: Thinking about Expert Evidence a
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
It is not difficult to imagine what this "something" might be. The
most likely explanation is that it is the word "fingerprint" that does the
expert's work of conveying to the jury the idea that this is an identification
process with very high probative value. Fingerprinting enjoys a very high
level of popular acceptance and enjoys a mythos that makes it nearly sy-
nonymous with infallibility. 113 In other words, it is not necessary for the
expert to state the probative value of this "identification" or "matching"
process; the jury does that for the expert based on the "cultural assump-
tion" that a latent print "match" or "identification" is an absolute fact and
the result of an "infallible" process. This saves the witness from having to
misstate the probative value of the evidence, or even from having to state it
all. The latter benefit is especially useful for latent print evidence where,
many scholars have argued, one of the fundamental problems is that ex-
pert witnesses have no way of generating a defensible estimate of the pro-
bative value of the evidence.' 14
2. Source Attribution Statements
Sixteen testimonies contained what I call "source attribution state-
ments." These are flat assertions that the defendant "made" the print, that
the print "is" the print of the defendant or that the defendant "could be
the only source" of the print. The model testimony cited above is an ex-
ample of such a statement.1 15 More typical is the following:
The No. 1 latent fingerprint was the No. 10 finger of Terry Patter-
son, which is the left little finger. The No. 2 latent fingerprint is
Terry Patterson's No. 9 finger, which is the left ring finger; and
the No. 3 latent is the No. 8 finger, which is the left middle finger
of Terry Patterson.' 16
These statements are more problematic than Process statements for
several reasons. First, they represent the problem of over-claiming that we
have been discussing here. It has become axiomatic among forensic scien-
113. See generally State v. Quintana, 103 P.3d 168 (Utah Ct. App. 2004)
(Thorne, J., concurring) ("In essence, we have adopted a cultural assumption that
a government representative's assertion that a defendant's fingerprint was found at
a crime scene is an infallible fact, and not merely the examiner's opinion."). This
"cultural assumption" is, of course, intensified by latent print examiners penchant
for declaring the technique infallible and for claiming that it has a zero error rate,
a topic explored in excessively exhaustive detail in other work. See generally Simon
A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J.
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985 (2005).
114. See generally THOMPSON & COLE, supra note 97; David M. Siegel et al., The
Reliability of Latent Print Individualization: Brief of Amici Curiae submitted on Behalf of
Scientists and Scholars by The New England Innocence Project, Commonwealth v. Patter-
son, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 21 (2006).
115. See generally United States v. Gilchrist, 204 Fed. Appx. 258 (2006).
116. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12 (Mass. 2005). Trial trans. at
5-78, on file with the author.
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tists that all forensic evidence is inherently probabilistic.' 1 7 It has been
cogently argued that latent print analysis must also be inherently probabil-
istic. 1 8 To claim that the defendant "made" the latent print is to essen-
tially claim that the analyst has reached a level of probability so high that
the possibility of the alternative hypothesis is no longer even worth men-
tioning to the fact-finder. Whether this is wise policy in any instance has
been questioned, 1 9 but it is particularly problematic when this purport-
edly astronomically high probability has not even been calculated but
merely subjectively inferred based on "experience." 120
Second, the statement that the defendant "made" the print would
seem not to be a scientific statement. It does not state the results of some
instrumental, or even subjective, laboratory process. It does not even con-
fine itself to the trace evidence. It is not a statement about the evidence
that the expert presumably analyzed. It is statement about an event that
occurred at the time of the crime, that the expert has presumably inferred
from the evidence. But why should an expert be permitted to make such
an inference? Shouldn't experts be expected to confine their statements
to what they can infer directly from the evidence before them? In this
case, that would be something closer to "the latent print and the defen-
dant's known print are not inconsistent with originating from a common
source" than "the defendant made the print." Of course, the law of expert
testimony is generally thought to control expert testimony in this precise
way. That the experts in these transcripts appear to have evaded that re-
striction without comment or sanction, I would suggest, supports my argu-
ment that the courts' attention is usually directed toward something other
than control (as opposed to admissibility) of expert testimony.
In such testimonies, experts have gone beyond the bounds of what
they know from their expert analysis into the realm of what they infer from
that analysis. The problem with such testimony is not merely that it in-
vades the province of the jury; it is that it is not science and not derived
solely from expert knowledge.121
3. Identity Statements
As noted, the third category of statements is less quantitatively signifi-
cant than the first two. Only three testimonies could not be accounted for
using the first two categories. These testimonies used what I call an "Iden-
117. See Aitken, supra note 100.
118. See CHAMPOD, supra note 103; Champod & Evett, supra note 103.
119. See Population Genetic Models, in FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE INTERPRETATION
65 (John Buckleton et al. eds., 2005).
120. See THOMPSON & COLE, supra note 97.
121. See Nance, supra note 11, at 243 (stating "for the expert to give an opin-
ion on an ultimate issue, the expert must implicitly weigh other evidence in a case,
including evidence that goes beyond any expert's asserted expertise"); see also
KAYE, supra note 58, at § 1.3.1. My formulation of this argument has also benefited
from discussions with Professor William C. Thompson.
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tity statement" at the source attribution moment. One additional testi-
mony used an Identity statement in conjunction with both other types of
statements. The expert witness states that the latent print and the refer-
ence print were "identical" or "one and the same." For example: "Finger
No. 6 on the submitted fingerprint card was one and the same with the
latent print that I developed on the Item 9 piece of paper."122
This category of statements is curious. To begin with, the testimony is
false. It is axiomatic in latent print examiners' and forensic scientists' own
literature that not only are no two impressions from different fingers
"identical," but no two impressions even of the same finger are "identi-
cal." 123 The correctly formulated testimony of a latent print expert wit-
ness should concern the possibility that the latent print and the known
print derive from a common source, not the possible sameness of the two
prints. The statements are also, of course, false as matters of logic and
semantics. The two prints are not "one and the same"; they are two differ-
ent prints. Arguably, they cannot be "identical" either, without some sort
of agreed upon definition of how much variance is permissible for two
prints to still be deemed "identical." 124
Even if Identity statements are taken at face value, as with the Process
statements, they leave unsaid information that would be important for a
statistically or logically informed evaluation of the statement. Even if two
prints are "identical," and something meaningful is meant by "identical," it
would still be necessary to know how many other individuals might also be
capable of producing prints deemed "identical" to one of these under
whatever parameters are being used to define "identicality."
Of course, as with Process statements, the persuasive value of Identity
statements is presumably not diminished by the fact that they make little
sense on their face. As with Process statements, the poor wording and
logic of Identity statements is presumably compensated for by the fact that
everyone-including, of course, jurors-knows what a latent print expert
witness means when he or she says that the latent print and the known
print are "one and the same." The expert does not mean that the prints
are exactly the same; he or she means that they appear generally the
same-the same "within tolerance" is the current parlance' 25-and that
the expert has inferred from this appearance of sameness that they must
122. SeeJackson v. Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 520 (Va. 2004), Tr. Trans., at
832.
123. See generally Wikipedia, Fingerprint, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finger
print (last visited Apr. 2, 2007) (explaining flexibility of friction ridge skin means
that no two finger or palm prints are ever exactly alike (never identical in every
detail), even two impressions recorded immediately after each other); see also IN-
MAN & RUDIN, supra note 97, at 133.
124. See generally CHAMPOD, supra note 103.
125. See, e.g., Thomas J. Ferriola, Scientfic Principles of Friction Ridge Analysis
and Applying Daubert to Latent Print Identification, available at http://www.clpex.com/
Articles/ScientificPrinciplesbyTomFerriola.htm. The ill-defined nature of the notion of
"tolerance" is one of the fundamental problems with latent print individualization.
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come from a common source and ruled out the possibility that they come
from different sources. ,
D. Other Attributes of Testimony
1. Bolstering
What is surprising about many of these testimonies is how little proba-
tive value they seem to convey. Most of them fail to actually address the
issue of the probative significance of the evidence. In eight of the thirty-
four cases, however, the perceived probative value of the evidence was bol-
stered by hyperbolic statements that, though not necessarily bearing any
logical relation to the probative value of the evidence, nonetheless pre-
sumably served to heighten the fact-finder's sense of the "infallibility" of
latent print analysis. Latent print expert witnesses told jurors that they
were "positive," that they were "absolutely certain," that they had "no
doubt" that the match was "to the elimination of all other fingers on the
planet" and that "once a fingerprint or a palm print has been identified to
an individual it cannot belong to anybody else except that individual."
Some of these statements, such as the experts' self-characterizations as be-
ing "positive" or "certain," may exploitjurors' (and perhaps experts') con-
fusion between confidence and accuracy. Others, however, such as the
claim to have eliminated all other fingers on the planet, have no basis. 126
2. Quantifications of Certainty
As noted, latent print examiners do not tend to attempt to quantify
the probative value of their conclusions of consistency. This is in part be-
cause no data exists from which to make a responsible estimate of that
value. In addition, however, latent print examiners are banned by profes-
sional guidelines from attaching probabilistic estimates to their conclu-
sions.1 27 An exception to the ban on quantification, however, is made for
the proportion "100%." This is because latent print examiners are permit-
ted to conclude that an individual is the only possible source of a latent
print in the universe.' 28 They are not, however, permitted to conclude
that an individual might be the source of a latent print (the only statistically
defensible conclusion). Obviously, under such conditions, the use of the
126. See CHAMPOD, supra note 101; THOMPSON & COLE, supra note 97; Sandy L.
Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13J.L. & POL'Y 143 (2005); Interpol European Expert
Group on Fingerprint Identification, Method for Fingerprint Identification (2007),
available at http://www.interpol.int/public/Forensic/fingerprints/WorkingPar-
ties/IEEGFI/ieegfi.asp#.
127. See generally Simon A. Cole, "Implicit Testing": Can Casework Validate Foren-
sic Techniques?, 46JURIMETRICSJ. 117 (2006); Int'l Assoc. for Identification, Resolu-
tion V, 30 IDENTIFICATION NEws 3 (1980); Int'l Assoc. for Identification, Resolution
VII, 29 IDENTIFICATION NEWS 1 (1979).
128. See Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis Study and Tech-
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proportion "100%" cannot be considered quantification in any meaning-
ful sense because it is the product of a policy decision rather than any sort
of reasoning or calculation. The fact-finder, however, is unlikely to be
aware of these background conditions and might interpret the use of the
proportion "100%" to be the outcome of some sort of chain of calcula-
tions based on meaningful data and information. Four of the thirty-four
testimonies quantified the witness's certainty as "100%," in this manner.
E. Conclusions from the Transcript Data
What is most surprising about the sloppiness of these formulations is
not so much that they are prejudicial to the defendant, but instead, how
little they offer to the government. Latent print expert witnesses' testimo-
nial statements are remarkably lax about giving prosecutors what they the-
oretically need in terms of probative value. It would appear that a good
deal of latent print testimony actually given in U.S. courtrooms is not par-
ticularly probative, but is nevertheless extremely persuasive. What, then,
accounts for the vaunted power of latent print evidence?
Again, the answer seems obvious. The power of the testimony derives
from the talismanic power of the word "fingerprint," rather than from any
articulation of the probative value of the evidence. 129 Indeed, one almost
suspects that latent expert witnesses could say the word "fingerprint" and
then essentially say anything that indicated that their conclusion was in-
criminating, rather than exculpatory, and the jury would afford the testi-
mony enormous probative value. 130 This suggests that the remedy I
propose in this article-greater judicial control over testimonial claims,
rather than over admissibility-may be insufficient in the case of latent
print testimony because the cultural mythos is so strong and so deep that
even judicial control over testimony may be incapable of overcoming it. It
is for this precise reason that Judge Thorne concluded that latent print
evidence required a jury instruction to overcome the "cultural assump-
tion" of its "infallibility." 131
A deeper way of thinking about this issue is suggested by Professor
Wells's seminal psychological research on juror evaluation of statistical evi-
129. This might suggest a reason that latent print practitioners have histori-
cally been so unconcerned with devising methods of calculating the probative
value of latent print evidence. In a sense, they have mapped an alterative route to
evidentiary power; rather than DNA's route through precisely quantified calcula-
tions of probative value, latent print evidence achieved evidentiary power through
cultural mythos. See generally Cole, supra note 81.
130. My argument about the power of the word "fingerprint" is supported by
the tendency of expert witnesses testifying about other disciplines to seek to utter
the word "fingerprint" whenever possible: "DNA fingerprinting," "brain finger-
printing," "unique marking just like a fingerprint," etc. See LYNCH, supra note 102.
131. State v. Quintana, 103 P.3d 168 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (Thorne, J.,
concurring).
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dence.'3 2 Wells sought to understand what has now become known as the
"Wells effect," juror reluctance to convict or award civil damages based on
a "naked statistic," a statistical inference unsupported by any other evi-
dence.13 3 The Wells effect has been illustrated by reference to the follow-
ing two statistically equivalent statements:
EXPERT WITNESS A. Based on a blood test that is 99.8% accurate, I
conclude that the defendant is the father.
EXPERT WITNESS B. Based on a blood test, there is a 99.8%
probability that the defendant is the father.
Wells found that jurors were much more likely to assign paternity
when presented with Expert A than when presented with Expert B. Wells
suggests that difference between the two statements has to do with the way
in which the expert witness vouches for the conclusion. Although the
probability is the same in both cases, Expert A has in some sense staked
something on the conclusion in a way that Expert B has not. Wells sug-
gests that this generates a bond between the evidence and the ultimate
fact for Expert A that is absent for Expert B: If the defendant turns out not
to be the father, then Expert A was wrong-having said something false-
but Expert B was not wrong. After all, Expert B clearly told the jury that
there was a chance, albeit a small one, that the defendant was not the
father. Were the defendant wrongly found liable for paternity, Expert B
certainly could not be held morally responsible. Expert A, however, would
seem more morally culpable. In short, Expert B shifts the moral responsi-
bility for making a difficult decision-whether to convict or award civil
damages based on nothing more than statistical evidence, even if the
probability of error is quite low-to the jury. Jurors, Wells suggests, do not
appreciate expert witnesses shifting that responsibility to them-they feel
it belongs with the expert. Therefore, jurors punish Expert B accordingly
by affording Expert B's testimony less weight even though its probative
value is statistically equivalent to that given by Expert A. Wells calls this a
"birectional test of good evidence"; "good" evidence, in jurors' view, is that
evidence whose truth or falsity is tightly bound to the truth or falsity of the
ultimate fact. "Good" evidence must become false when the ultimate fact
that it indicates is proven to be false. 13 4 Thus, Expert A's testimony sur-
vives the bidirectional test of good evidence, but Expert B's does not.
How does the Wells effect map onto fingerprint evidence? Professor
Wells himself pointed to fingerprint evidence as an example of the sort of
evidence that might pass the bidirectional test. In making this argument,
132. See generally Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Statistical
Probability Enough?, 62 J. OF PERSONALrTY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 739 (1992).
133. This is, of course, the famous "blue bus" problem, beloved of evidence
professors. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in
the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1329 (1971).
134. The close resemblance between this concept and Popper's notion of fal-
sificationism, supra Part I, is too apparent to pass without remark.
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Wells used a formulation that would correspond to the Source Attribution
Statements I have previously described. 135 Indeed, his argument would
certainly seem to hold for those statements. In Source Attribution State-
ments, the expert witness flatly states that the defendant is the source of
the print. Even the preamble about the accuracy of the test used in
Wells's simulation is gone. The latent print expert witness is fully morally
accountable if the testimony turns out to be mistaken. 13 6 Indeed, some
latent print examiners have located the reliability of the technique in pre-
cisely this notion of moral accountability. 1
37
But what of the Process Statements? Assessing whether or not these
statements meet the bidirectional test is more difficult mainly because they
are so devoid of probative value; they are not on their face incriminating
statements, and thus, it is difficult for them to meet bidirectionality. It is
notable, however, that eight of the seventeen Process statements use the
first person (e.g, "I identified all three fingerprints with Mr. Terry Nich-
ols.") .138 Perhaps by the use of the first person, the witness takes moral
responsibility in the manner described by Professor Wells.
VIII. CONCLUSION
I have argued that in controlling the problem of expert evidence,
judges and legal scholars need to shift their focus from the admissibility of
evidence to control of testimony. I have suggested that the dangers to
naive fact-finders rests not so much with hearing the evidence at all, but
rather with over-claiming that is often, and in some cases routinely, at-
tached to expert testimony. I have attempted to illustrate this point with
some modest empirical data on what I believe to be the typical practice of
expert testimony for one of the best trusted forms of forensic evidence in
the U.S. over the last two decades.
I believe that this data supports my argument, but it is illuminating in
other ways as well. First, it demonstrates the wide variability of testimony
135. See Wells, supra note 132, at 749 ("Fingerprint experts, when allowed to
state conclusions (e.g. 'I conclude that the prints lifted from the glass are those of
the defendant'), are likely to pass this bidirectional test of good evidence.").
136. This does not mean, of course, that some latent print examiners who do
make mistakes are not capable of shifting blame, uttering things like "the system
failed me" or "I made an honest mistake." See generally Simon A. Cole, More Than
Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 985 (2005). In marked contrast, was the behavior of some, but not all of
the examiners in the Mayfield misattribution who readily accepted blame for the
error. See generally Simon A. Cole, The Prevalence and Potential Causes of Wrongful
Conviction by Fingerprint Evidence, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 39 (2006).
137. See Rhonda Boston, 147 THE WEEKLY DETAIL (June 7, 2004), http://www.
clpex.com/Articles/TheDetail/l00-199/TheDetai147htm ("The latent print examiner
needs to realize that each and every time he or she makes a call on an identifica-
tion/individualization they put themselves and their credentials on the line.").
138. See Court TV, The Oklahoma City Bombing Trial Transcripts: Terry Nichols
(Nov.14,1997), available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/casefiles/Oklahoma/
nichtranscri-pts/1 114am.html.
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that can be attached to what is essentially the same evidence in U.S. court-
rooms. Such casualness concerning how testimony is phrased illustrates
my argument that courts and scholars have focused too much on admissi-
bility of evidence and too little on the nuances of testimony. Testimony
should not be this haphazard. There is no way to exercise judicial control
over testimony until the testimony itself is stabilized and standardized. La-
tent print examiners, for example, are restricted to only three possible
conclusions, but have almost no restrictions on their testimony.1 39 For rou-
tine procedures like latent print analysis, testimony should be profession-
ally controlled at least to the extent that conclusions are professionally
controlled. 140 Once professional bodies articulate what testimony they
think is defensible, the question of whether such testimony is indeed de-
fensible can then be litigated. This would be sort of pragmatic approach
to a particular problem with the use of scientific and technical evidence in
the courts for which No Magic Wand so resoundingly calls.
139. The exception, perhaps, is the ban on probabilistic statements. For a
discussion of the exception, see supra note 125 and accompanying text.
140. See Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis Study and Tech-
nology, Standards for Conclusions, J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION (2004), available at
http://www.swgfast.org/Standardsfor_Conclusions verl_0.pdf; see also The The-
ory of Identification in Ronald Nichols, The Scientific Foundation of Firearms and Tool
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